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College Law: 1970-1971
Second of a Series of Surveys
Thomas E. Blackwell*
N THE FIRST ARTICLE of this series,1 your attention was directed to the
fact that college law is a comparatively new area of specialization
in our system of jurisprudence. For many years, the number of court
decisions involving institutions of higher education was quite small. The
first text on the subject was published in 1936.2 It was a pioneer effort
to assemble and to classify the more significant of the judicial experiences
of the colleges. The first meeting of the National Association of College
and University Attorneys was held at the University of Michigan in 1961.
The evolution and development of college law has continued to ac-
celerate during the past year. Perhaps the best indication of the topics
of direct and current concern to those practicing in this area of legal
specialization is the agenda of the June 1970 meeting of the NACUA.
With few exceptions, the papers presented emphasized the problem of
order on the campus and the role of the judiciary in its preservation.
Marshall A. Neil, Associate Justice of the Washington State Supreme
Court in his keynote address, reminded those present that:
Institutions of higher learning are presently preoccupied with
two problems which are related, yet foreign, to the primary func-
tion of teaching: the problem of finding ways and means of handling
student discontent and the resultant problem of maintaining fi-
nancial support as the public becomes more and more disenchanted
with the happenings on campuses.3
Injunctions Restraining Physical Disturbances
At the request of the American Council on Education, a committee
of the National Association of College and University Attorneys prepared
and submitted a special report on the use of the injunction in the re-
straint of campus disorders. According to Edward C. Kalaidjian, Coun-
sel for Columbia University:
During the present year, the equitable remedy of injunction has
emerged as one of the more effective means available to institutions
of higher education to cope with disruptive activities and vandalism
on their campuses. The efficacy of injunctions received much atten-
tion in the public press about a year ago when Columbia University
successfully used a restraining order to terminate the occupation of
two buildings by an SDS group of several hundred persons on May
1st, 1969. The academic world quickly noted that a major building
occupation had been terminated without the use of a single police-
man on the campus.4
Of Santa Monica, California; retired vice-chancellor of Washington Univ.; pub-
lisher of the College Law Digest; member of the National Ass'n of College & Uni-
versity Attorneys; etc.
I Blackwell, Evolution and Development of College Law, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 95
(1971).
2 E. ELiorr and M. CaAmEss, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS (1936).
3 Neil, The Courts "Invade the Campus", 5 COLLEGE COUNSEL 1 (1970).
4 Kallaidjian, The Injunctive Process in Student Uprisings, 5 COLLEGE COUNSEL 43
(1970).
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One who knowingly violates an injunction may be prosecuted for
contempt of court. However, the accused must be shown to have had
notice of the injunction when he violated it. It is therefore essential
that care be taken in the drafting of the court order and that wide pub-
licity be given to its provisions and scope. The importance of these
procedures is illustrated by the results of two recent court decisions.
After prolonged student demonstrations on the campus of the State
University of New York at Buffalo in February of 1970, the university
obtained a court order enjoining students "and all those persons re-
ceiving notice of this injunction" from interfering with the normal and
lawful operations of university facilities. On March 11th, the faculty
senate approved a resolution urging the acting president of the univer-
sity to order the withdrawal of all police from the campus. He took
no action in this regard. Certain faculty members entered his office
and refused to leave when asked to do so. In a paper presented to a
member of his staff, they stated that the group would remain until the
police were removed from the campus. They were arrested and con-
victed of criminal contempt of court. Upon appeal, their convictions
were reversed on the grounds that even if they had notice of the in-
junction, they were not bound by its terms, because (1) they were not
parties to the disruptive activities which led to the issuance of the in-
junction; (2) they were not named as parties in the injunction pro-
ceedings; (3) they were not charged with acting in concert with or as
agents of, the parties named in the injunction.5
The second case involved a disruption on the campus of Washington
University. On March 23, 1970, approximately two hundred fifty in-
dividuals entered, without permission, several buildings of the university
and engaged in conduct, described later by the court as "a riot." On
the following day, the university obtained an injunction restraining
similar conduct in the future by "individuals who may gain actual
knowledge of this Order." On the night of May 5th, while the injunc-
tion was still in full effect, a crowd of over six hundred set fire to the
ROTC building on the campus. Several participants were arrested
and convicted of contempt of court. In a habeas corpus proceeding to
review their convictions, the St. Louis County Court of Appeals held
that notice of the restraining order was insufficient to sustain the con-
viction of certain of the petitioners, but affirmed the convictions of others
not parties to the injunction proceeding.6
According to George V. Powell, President of the Board of Regents
of the University of Washington:
The month of May 1970 must surely be acknowledged to have
been the most tumultuous and the most hazardous in the history of
American higher education. . . . Based upon experience here and
elsewhere throughout the nation, however, neither the availability
of criminal statutes nor the possibilities of court injunctive pro-
cedures appear fully to prevent campus disruption and violence.
Much of the effectiveness of either will depend upon the avail-
5 S.U.N.Y. v. Denton, 35 App. Div. 2d 176, 316 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1970).
6 Mechanic v. Greenfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
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ability of law enforcement forces and the practical ability to identify
particular individuals in the act of breaking the law, an especially
persistent problem in mass actions. 7
The Board of Governors of the American Bar Association authorized
the appointment of a Commission on Campus Government and Student
Dissent in August, 1969 and charged it with "responsibility to develop
legal standards, procedures, and administrative guidelines relevant to
student unrest and campus violence." In the section on the use of in-
junctions, the commission outlined the advantages and disadvantages of
this legal instrumentality as follows:
The injunction constitutes a public declaration by the courts of
the unlawful nature of the actions taken or threatened by the dis-
rupting students. The issuance of an injunction may generate a
favorable public reaction to the positions of the university. It may
persuade moderate students to refrain from participating in the
disruption. It imposes restraint upon the disrupting students by a
non-university governmental entity. Students may obey a court
order when they would ignore the orders of a university official . ..
There are also disadvantages. It is frequently necessary to
utilize local law enforcement officers to serve process. In most
states, the injunction is not self-enforcing, although at least one state
statute makes a violation of an injunction a crime in itself. Enforce-
ment of an injunction through court proceedings may involve some of
the same problems as those presented when police are used to quell
a disturbance. A university that is not prepared to enforce the in-
junction through contempt proceedings should not seek one. To ob-
tain an injunction in such a situation might permit a court decree to
be flouted by students with impunity.8
Control of Student Publications and Speech
Another area of current concern to college administrators is the
question of the degree of control they may and should exercise over
the contents of student publications. The Assistant Attorney General
of the State of Maryland, Estelle A. Fishbein, introduced this topic for
discussion at the 1970 conference of the NACUA as follows:
The rise in campus militancy in the past decade has been ac-
companied by an increasingly strident student press. With de-
pressing frequency, campus administrators are hard put to decide
what posture to assume with regard to student publications which
seek to push the freedom of the press and freedom of speech to
their outermost limits. Administrators are often faced with student
editors who apparently feel impelled to communicate their thoughts
by enthusiastic use of obscene words and cartoons, suggestive photog-
raphy, obscenities, and possibly libelous statements directed at
school administrators, government officials, and private citizens un-
fortunate enough to incur student ire.9
Apparently, the first case arising out of a dispute between the editor
of a student publication and a university administrator involved an
7 Powell, A Perspective on the Campus: May 1970, 1 U. WASH. Rpr., No. 3 (1970).
8 REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION OF CAMPus GOVERNMENT AND
STUDENT DISSENT 27.
9 Fishbien, The University's Right to Control Over Student Publications, 5 COLLEGE
COUNSEL 65 (1970).
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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editorial critical of state legislators published in the student newspaper
at Troy State College.1o The editor had been instructed not to publish
the editorial on the grounds that to do so would violate a university
regulation to the effect that student publications must not include com-
ments critical of the governor or the state legislature.
The student editor left his editorial space blank, with the word
"censored" across the page. He mailed his censored editorial to a public
newspaper. His conduct was deemed "willful and deliberate insubordi-
ation" and it constituted the sole basis for his expulsion. The court, in
ordering his re-instatement, said:
A state cannot force a college student to forfeit his constitu-
tionally protected right of freedom of expression as a condition to
his attending a state-supported institution.105
This case involved the question of judicial review of disciplinary
action taken by a public institution against a student as well as freedom
of expression. In a more recent decision," a federal district court was
faced squarely with the question of the degree of control a public in-
stitution may exert over a student publication. The editorial staff of
the student newspaper at Fitchburg State College decided to reprint an
article written by Eldridge Cleaver which had been printed in a maga-
zine of national distribution. The president of the college took the
position that he was compelled by state statutes to see that funds derived
from the required student activities fee were properly spent. He ap-
pointed an advisory board to prevent the publication of material con-
sidered by the administration to be unsuited for a campus newspaper.
The authority of the advisory board was challenged and the court
chose to construe the powers conferred on the board in the narrowest
possible light; that is, that the board's censorial powers could be exer-
cised only over the obscene. The following are excerpts from the opin-
ion:
Obscenity in a campus newspaper is not the type of occurrence
apt to be significantly disruptive of an orderly and disciplined edu-
cational process. Furthermore, assuming that a college administra-
tation has a sufficient educationally oriented reason to prevent the
circulation of obscenity on campus, there has been no showing that
the harm from obscenity in a college setting is so much greater
than in the public forum that it outweighs the danger to free ex-
pression inherent in censorship without procedural safeguards....
We are well beyond the belief that any manner of state regu-
lation is permissible simply because it involves an activity which
is a part of the university structure and is financed with funds con-
trolled by the administration. The state is not necessarily the un-
restricted master of what it creates and fosters. Thus, in cases con-
cerning school-supported publications or the use of school facilities,
the courts have refused to recognize as permissible any regulations
infringing free speech when not shown to be necessarily related
110 Dickey v. Alabama, 273 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Ala. 1967). See also Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
loa Dickey v. Alabama, 273 F. Supp. 613 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
11 Antonelli v. Hammond. 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970).
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to the maintenance of order and discipline within the educational
process. lia
However, a California court has upheld the authority of a state uni-
versity to discipline students for the repeated public use of objectionable
language. The court said:
The question here is whether the University's requirement that
plaintiffs conform to the community's accepted norms of propriety
with respect to the loud, repeated public use of certain terms was
reasonably necessary in furthering the University's educational
goals. We note that plaintiffs were not disciplined for protesting
the arrest of Thompsen, but for doing so in a particular manner.
The qualification imposed was simply that plaintiffs refrain from
repeatedly, loudly and publicly using certain terms which, when
so used, clearly infringed on the minimum standard of propriety
and the accepted norm of public behavior of both the academic
community and the broader social community .... r
The courts have not as yet been called upon to rule upon the de-
gree of control a private institution of education may exercise over the
publications of its students. Only where state action is invoked is it
possible to raise the constitutional questions of freedom of speech and
expression. It would seem that a private institution sponsoring the pub-
lication of student periodicals is still entitled to all the privileges and
prerogatives of a private publisher and owner.
In 1967 the American Association of University Professors recom-
mended that:
Wherever possible, the student newspaper should be an inde-
pendent corporation, financially and legally separate from the uni-
versity.
However, the AAUP also warned that:
... the editorial freedom of student editors and managers
entails corollary responsibilities to be governed by the canons of re-
sponsible journalism, such as the avoidance of libel, indecency, un-
documented allegations, attacks on personal integrity and the tech-
niques of harassment and innuendo .... 13
In response to a request to name the most significant case decided
during the academic year 1970-1971 involving an institution of higher
education, John E. Landon, Associate Counsel of the Regents of the Uni-
versity of California, directed our attention to one in which his own
institution was the defendant. 14
On February 26, 1968, members of a student organization, known as
the Campus Draft Opposition (CDO), applied for permission to use the
Greek Theatre on the Berkeley campus for what they termed "The
Vietnam Commencement." In its published statement, the CDO said:
Ila Id.
12 Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967).
13 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, AAUP BULL. (Winter 1967),
363. See also THE STUDENT NWSPAPER: A REPORT OF A COMMSSION APPOINTED BY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNVSITY OF CALIFORNIA (Am. Council on Education, Wash-
ington, D. C.).
14 Sellers v. Regents of Univ. of California, 432 F. 2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970).
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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The commencement will resemble, in its general outline, the
traditional formal university graduation. We hope to attract na-
tionally-known speakers and to present our own honorary degrees
to men and women who have taken noteworthy public stands in the
cause of ending American involvement in Vietnam. In choosing
such a ceremony, with its attendant academic symbolism, the CDO
intends to stress the intellectual and moral integrity of the act of
refusing to serve.
The officers of the university, concerned with the legality of the
proposed assembly, requested a formal opinion from the general coun-
sel of the board of regents. He was of the opinion that the proposed use
of the theatre would be in violation of the following provisions of a
federal statute:
[A]ny person . . . who knowingly counsels, sides, or abets
another to refuse or evade registration or service in the armed
forces or any of the requirements of this title . . . or the rules or
regulations made pursuant thereto, or who conspires to commit any
one or more of such offences shall [be subject to criminal prose-
cution] ."s
The general counsel also expressed the opinion that the proposed func-
tion would be in violation of a resolution of the board of regents that
university facilities shall not be used for the purpose of organizing
or carrying out unlawful activities.
The chancellor of the Berkeley campus, acting upon advice of coun-
sel, denied the use of the theatre to the members of the Campus Draft
Opposition. They filed a complaint in a federal district court, seeking
an injunction, a declaratory judgment, and damages. They alleged that
the action of the chancellor abridged their constitutional rights of free-
dom of speech and assembly and the equal protection of the laws. Their
petition was denied and they appealed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the decision of the district
court, said:
As stated in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966), "The
State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to pre-
serve the property under its control for the use for which it is law-
fully dedicated." Here, Appellee, in the exercise of its power to gov-
ern the University and in the pursuit of a valid interest in that area,
as most, has only incidently infringed on First Amendment free-
dom .... We must recognize that First Amendment rights are not
absolute. Regulations as to time, place, and manner of exercise of
such rights are proper when reasonably related to a valid public
interest.1 6
The students filed a petition with the United States Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari, but by an eight to one vote, the hearing was denied.
17
Those fortunate enough to have attended a commencement in the
Greek Theatre on the Berkeley campus of the University of California in
a less turbulent era will long remember its classic beauty and, the dig-
15 50 U.S.C. §462(a).
16 Sellers v. Regents of Univ. of California, 432 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970).
17 Sellers v. Regents of Univ. of California, ____ U.S. ____ (1971).
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nity of the academic procession of faculty and graduates descending
the marble steps of this imposing amphitheatre. As we have seen, the
United States Supreme Court has refused to permit it to be used for a
mock commencement and the conferring of pseudo-honorary degrees
upon those who have publicly declared their unwillingness to serve their
country.
When requested to explain why he had designated this action of
the high court as "The Decision of the Year" in the area of college law,
Mr. Landon said:
I think the case is of some significance. It tends to prove that,
even in this day when anything and everything appears to go, it is
still occasionally possible to preserve a jewel for its intended use."'
Nonresident Fees at Public Institutions
The nonresident tuition fee of public institutions of higher educa-
tion has been under almost continuous attack in the courts during the
past year. The leading case on its constitutionality was decided in 1922.19
The state statute in question defined the term "nonresident" as one who
had not been a bona fide resident of the state for one year prior to this
admission to the university. The court held that the imposition, by the
Board of Regents of the University of California, of a $75 admission
fee for nonresidents was neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional.
There have been many cases involving the interpretation of regu-
lations adopted to determine the status of "resident" and "nonresident"
for the assessment of the nonresident tuition fee,20 but a new basis for
challenging its assessment was provided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1969 when it ruled that a state may not impose a waiting period
before granting a new resident the benefits of welfare payments. 21 The
court viewed the denial of welfare benefits to such individuals as an im-
pediment upon their right to travel from one state to another. Mr. Justice
Brennan observed that:
The Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal
Union and our concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our
land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreason-
ably burden or restrict this movement.
A student enrolled at the University of California utilized this con-
cept of a constitutional right of interstate travel, enunciated in the
Shapiro case, to challenge the validity of a regulation requiring one
year of residence in the state in order to obtain the benefit of free tuition.
The California Court of Appeals rejected her challenge 22 and she filed an
Is Letter from John E. Landon, April 28, 1971.
10 Bryan v. Regents of Univ. of California, 188 Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071 (1922).
20 Clark v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Newman v. Bowers, 92 Ia. 90,
349 P.2d 716 (1960). See also R. CARBONE, RESIDENT OR NONRESIDENT: TUITION CLASSI-
FICATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE STATES (Education Comm. of the States,
Denver).
21 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
22 Kirk v. Board of Regents of Univ. of California, 396 U.S. 554 (1970), dismissing
appeal from 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1970).
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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appeal with the United States Supreme Court, dismissed by a 5 to 3
decision for want of a substantial federal question.
The California court had based its decision on footnote 21 in the
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the Shapiro case in
which the court said:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-
free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt
or fish, and so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling
state interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be
penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate
travel.23
The California court, in justification of its decision, said:
While we fully recognize the value of higher education, we can-
not equate its attainment with food, clothing and shelter. Shapiro
involved the immediate and pressing need for preservation of life
and health of persons unable to live without public assistance, and
their dependent children. ... Charging higher tuition fees to non-
resident students cannot be equated with granting basic subsistence
to one class of needy residents while denying it to another equally
needy class of residents.2 4
Collective Bargaining on Campus
According to William F. McHugh, Associate Counsel for the State
University of New York, the demand for collective bargaining rights by
faculty members and other professionals has continued to increase during
the current year.2 5 Labor leaders have shown an increasing interest in
organizing the employees of institutions of higher education.
This effort to recruit members from the campus began many years
ago. At first it was confined to the "blue collar" workers of the main-
tenance department. Gradually the campaign was expanded to include
clerical workers and technicians. The drive to unionize members of the
faculty went into high gear in 1961, when the United Federation of
Teachers, an AFL-CIO affiliate, was designated as the bargaining agent
for teachers in the New York City School system. In 1965 the federa-
tion announced that it had received a grant from the AFL-CIO to finance
a drive to organize 5,000 California state college teachers.
The early common law of England and America declared that the
organization of workers to bargain collectively with their employers
constituted a "criminal conspiracy" and it was punished accordingly.
This harsh doctrine was gradually modified by court decisions and by
legislation. But the weight of public opinion continued to oppose the
idea of permitting federal, state, and municipal employees to make use
of group pressure to enforce their demands.
In 1919 Calvin Coolidge, then governor of Massachusetts, became a
national figure overnight by his famous declaration during the Boston
23 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n. 21 (1969).
24 Kirk v. Board of Regents of Univ. of California, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 260 (1970).
25 McHugh, Recent Developments in Collective Bargaining in Higher Education,
5 COLLEGE COUNSEL 159 (1970).
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police strike, that "There is no right to strike against the public safety by
anybody, anywhere, at any time."
A good friend of organized labor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, expressed
the opinion that "a strike by public employees manifests nothing less
than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of gov-
ernment . . . and such action is unthinkable and intolerable."
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935,20 sometimes referred to
as the Wagner Act, declared it to be the policy of the federal govern-
ment to protect the right of workers in private industry to organize for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment. But Section 2 of that act specifically excluded federal and state
employees from the benefits of the legislation.27
In amending the Taft-Hartley Act of 1955, Congress made it clear
that strikes against the federal government are illegal, and it authorized
the federal courts to enjoin such action. By an executive order dated
June 17, 1962, the late President Kennedy granted federal employees the
right to form, join, and assist any employee organization. Such organi-
zations may now be designated as the exclusive bargaining agent for
federal employees.
Among the states, there is an increasingly strong trend to enact laws
giving their public employees the right to select their own bargaining
representatives. However, no state has granted public employees the
right to strike. Thirteen years ago a California court held that a strike
against the state university was illegal because there was, in the judges'
opinion, no such thing as the right to strike against the state or one of
its agencies. 28 In a more recent decision, a Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that there exists a reasonable basis for distinguishing between
private and public employees; that the denial of the right to strike to
public employees, while granting such right to private employees, does
not constitute denial of equal protection of the law in the constitutional
sense.
29
Last March, a three-judge district court ruled that no employee, at
common law, whether public or private, has a constitutional right to
strike in concert with his fellow workers. The court, after pointing out
the fact that the right of private employees to strike had received full
Congressional sanction by the enactment of Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, said:
The asserted right of public employees to strike has often been
litigated and, so far as I know, it has never been recognized as a
matter of law .... If the right of public employees to strike-with
all its political and social ramifications-is to be recognized and pro-
tected by the judiciary, it should be done by the Supreme Court
2G 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168.
27 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2).
28 Newmaker v. Regents of Univ. of California, 160 Cal. App. 2d 627, 325 P.2d 558
(1958).
29 Jefferson County Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 463 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. Ct. App.
1970).
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which has the power to reject established jurisprudence and the
authority to enforce such a sweeping rule.30
The commerce clause of the Constitution has been interpreted and
expanded by decisions of the United States Supreme Court so that Con-
gress may now regulate not only commerce among the several states, but
also almost any activity within a state if, in the opinion of the Court, it
"substantially affects" interstate commerce.3 1 On this basis, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has not hesitated to take jurisdiction over
labor disputes involving the employees of colleges and universities where
the activity in which they are engaged is deemed to have a substantial
effect upon the stream of interstate commerce.
By the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, the only
non-profit organizations specifically exempted from the jurisdiction of
the NLRB are hospitals.3 2 However, as a matter of policy, the board de-
cided that it would not accept jurisdiction unless the employees of non-
profit educational institutions were engaged in what the board deemed
to be the "commercial" activities of such institutions, such as com-
mercially sponsored research projects.
However, on June 12, 1970, the NLRB declared that it would now
assert its jurisdiction over labor disputes involving employees engaged
in the primary functions of institutions of higher education, if such activi-
ties were sufficiently large, in terms of dollar volume, to substantially
affect interstate commerce.3 The board took this new position at the
request of several large universities.
The motivation for this action on the part of the universities was
the extension of the provisions of the New York Public Employees Fair
Employment Act, sometimes called the Taylor Law, to include private
as well as public employees within the scope of its provisions. The act
had created a Public Employment Relations Board. 4
After reviewing the provisions of the Taylor Law, as amended, the
members of the governing board of Syracuse University apparently de-
cided that they would prefer to have labor disputes with their employees
adjudicated by the National Labor Relations Board rather than by the
Public Employment Relations Board.35 During September of 1969 Cor-
nell University also. filed petitions with the NLRB, requesting that it
assert jurisdiction over labor disputes involving its employees. Before
the end of the year, Yale University had filed similar petitions.
According to a recent survey conducted by the American As-
sociation of University Professors, collective bargaining agreements
with faculty members are now in force in thirty-seven institutions of
higher education in this country. The American Federation of Teachers
30 Postal Clerks v. Blount, ____ F. Supp. ____ (D.D.C. 1971).
31 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
32 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
33 Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 41 (1970). See also Sherman and Black, The Labor
Board and the Private Employer: A Critical Examination of the Board's "Worthy
Cause" Exemption, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1323 (1970).
34 N. Y. Civil Service Law §§ 200-212 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
35 Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 41 (1970).
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has been selected as the agency for negotiation at ten institutions; the
AAUP at three; the United Federation of College Teachers at two and
the National Education Association, at one. The Association of New
Jersey State College Faculties, Inc. initiated litigation to determine who
was the "public employer" authorized to bargain collectively with the
representatives of the public employees of the state under the pro-
visions of the Employer-Employee Relations Act, adopted in 1968. The
state supreme court held that the governor of the state, acting through
his Office of Employee Relations, rather than the State Board of Higher
Education, was the agency authorized to act.36
The first National Conference on Collective Negotiations in Higher
Education, sponsored by the City University of New York, was held
during May of 1970. The papers presented at the conference were pub-
lished in revised versions in the February 1971 issue of the Wisconsin
Law Review.
36 Association of NJ. State College Faculties v. Board of Higher Educ., 112 N.J.
Super. 237, 270 A.2d 744 (1970).
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